I’ve
been thinking a lot lately about the situation in Greece. The
question in my mind is whether this will become a trigger event that
leads into the next phase of the ongoing financial crisis. In my
mind, by the way, this crisis began at the turn of the century when
the credit cycle – two decades into its expansionary phase at that
point – finally rolled over. So anyway, here are my thoughts on how
the “Greek affair” might play out.
Suppose
that Greece simply defaults on its debt. It declares a moratorium on
all principal and interest payments until such time as its economy
has recovered. Does that mean that Greece must exit the eurozone and
return to the drachma?
I
would argue not! The Greeks have clearly rejected austerity, but does
that mean they want to resurrect the drachma? Do Greeks really want
to go the way of Zimbabwe or the Weimar Republic?
If
the drachma were resurrected, it would immediately become a banana
currency from which Greek citizens would be the first to flee. The
Greek central bank would find itself in a position similar to
Argentina or Venezuela, under constant assault by the markets and
struggling to stave off a currency collapse. Unless the Greek central
bank is willing to go the way of Zimbabwe, interest rates will be sky
high and could easily lead to circumstances even worse than what the
Greeks have already experienced.
My
point is, for the foreseeable future the Greek government will not be
able to tap the credit markets, whether it remains under the tutelage
of the Troika or defaults. It has no choice but to live within its
means and run a balanced budget, and there is a strong possibility
that the Syriza government understands this situation. In other
words, austerity cannot be avoided no matter what path the government
takes.
Given
that austerity is inevitable, why not give the Troika the middle
finger and then rally public support for the measures that need to be
taken? If Greek citizens see that the Syriza government has been true
to its word, the sense of crisis created by a default may facilitate
passage of needed reforms.
The
first casualty of a Greek default would be its banking system. But
the Greeks have had plenty of advance warning. Surely by now everyone
with assets to protect has a bank account in Zurich or Frankfurt or
London or New York. Surely even the least sophisticated and least
wealthy of Greeks know to keep their cash under the mattress rather
than in a bank that could topple any day. Why does Greece need any
domestic banks? If there are profitable banking opportunities in
Greece, foreign banks will be eager to establish branches, and
investors may even start up new, fully-capitalized banks.
I
suppose that it would be difficult for the Greek government to run
its affairs without any domestic banks. Having defaulted, the
government might have to deal with creditors trying to seize any
deposits held in offshore banks. But it’s hard to believe that
there wouldn’t be at least one bank willing to provide the
government with protected accounts, and I’m sure the Greek
government would make it worth that bank’s while. The crucial
question in all this, of course, is whether the Syriza government
will actually attack the corruption and cronyism that plagues the
country, and whether this government will provide an environment
conducive to economic growth.
In
any case, let’s just assume that Greece has defaulted and, as I
just described, now refuses to leave the eurozone. What happens?
A
Greek default would force its creditors to write down their holdings,
and most of that debt is now held by official institutions. That
means the European Central Bank and other government entities, which
are not supposed to ever incur losses, would in fact incur losses.
And that would pose a serious political challenge to the entire
edifice of bailouts that has been erected to support the debt of the
Club Med countries. It might even call into question the rollout of
Quantitive Easing by the ECB this coming March. Eventually, the
markets might even start to price in the fact that most governments
are bankrupt, and that they are dependent on constant monetization of
their debt in order to avoid financial collapse.
From
another perspective, if Greece is able to default on its debt and
weather the storm, that might inspire the other Club Med countries to
push for significant restructuring of their own debt. Spanish
elections are scheduled for late this year, and the Podemos party has
come from nowhere to lead in the polls. French elections are just
over two years away, and the National Front leads in the polls. Who
knows how long the current Italian government will last, and the Five
Star Movement is waiting in the wings. At a minimum, it’s hard to
imagine that these countries wouldn’t at least try to weasel out of
taking their share of the losses from a Greek default. German outrage
at being asked to shoulder even more losses would surely ratchet up
the political pressure.
At
some point a schism will develop between the hard money (northern)
members of the eurozone, who refuse to finance any more bailouts, and
the Club Med (southern) members who refuse to continue down the path
of austerity. All of which will bring us to a climactic moment.
I
predict that there will eventually be an emergency weekend meeting of
the eurozone finance ministers, or perhaps even the prime ministers.
The markets will be on the brink, the politics of the zone will have
reached a stalemate, and it will be painfully obvious to all the
ministers present that the monetary union can no longer be sustained.
At that moment, I believe the southern members will ask the hard
money members to withdraw from a position of strength, rather than
forcing the Club Med members to withdraw from a position of weakness.
And faced with a political disaster of epic proportions, I believe
that request will be granted as a sop to appease somewhat the bitter
feelings that will surely endure for a long time to come.
This
may very well be the strategy of the current Greek government, and if
so would be all the more reason for Greece not to exit the eurozone
after defaulting. Freed of the constraints imposed by Germany and its
monetary brethren, the ECB (whose HQ would presumably move to Paris)
could open the monetary spigots and provide financing to all the Club
Med countries, Greece included. There are nineteen members of the
eurozone, and I predict nine of them would remain after this schism
(Belgium, Cyprus, France, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Slovenia &
Spain). Together, they would wield enough economic heft to support a
currency regime on a par with any large Third World country.
By
convincing Germany et al. to exit the eurozone, the Club Med
countries would be spared the necessity of re-introducing their
legacy currencies, re-denominating bank accounts and financial
instruments, and arbitrarily re-writing contracts to the advantage of
one party and the disadvantage of the other. Their markets could open
normally on Monday morning, and everything would function exactly as
it had the previous Friday, except of course that now the ECB has
their backs beyond any shadow of a doubt.
But
what about Germany and the exiting countries? First of all, I do not
believe that they will form a new common currency regime. If they
exit the eurozone, there will be absolutely zero political appetite
for another monetary adventure. They will resurrect their legacy
currencies and carry on as before. There may very well be a currency
bloc where different countries peg their currencies to one another.
But when monetary pressures build, they will be addressed by simply
adjusting the peg, just as was done before the Maastricht treaty came
into effect.
So,
the emergency weekend meeting concludes with a decision that ten
countries will exit the eurozone (Austria, Estonia, Finland, Germany,
Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands & Slovakia ).
At this point, conventional thinking seems to be that the countries
pulling out will declare an emergency banking holiday for a day or
two while all the accounts in each country are converted into its
legacy currency. I do not agree, and here is my alternative scenario.
I
think that instead, Germany et al. will announce that in the next few
days, each country will bring back its own legacy currency. These
resurrected currencies will not replace the euro, but rather will
circulate alongside the common currency. There will be no automatic
re-denomination of accounts, and all contracts will be honored as
written. When the markets open on Monday, the euro will drop sharply
but everything throughout the entire eurozone will function normally,
just as it did on the previous Friday.
Then,
when each exiting country has put in place the technical requirements
for resurrecting its legacy currency, its central bank will hold
auctions where it sells some of the newly created currency for gold
and foreign currencies that it wants to hold as reserves, thereby
injecting appropriate amounts of the legacy currency into the banking
system. In the early days these resurrected currencies may only exist
in electronic form, just like the euro when it was first introduced,
but notes and coins should start to circulate within a matter of
weeks. Simultaneously with its central bank injecting the resurrected
currency into the banking system, the government of each exiting
country will auction debt denominated in said legacy currency. *
With
only the Club Med countries remaining in the eurozone, the common
currency will drop sharply against the legacy currencies coming back
into existence. While the government debt of the Club Med countries
may be money good, now that the ECB has their back, it’s money good
in a rapidly depreciating currency. That means euro interest rates
will quickly move back toward levels that reflect the risk of
inflation, probably north of 5%. The combination of higher interest
rates and a depreciating euro will allow the exiting countries to
retire their euro-denominated debt at a significant discount in terms
of their newly issued legacy currency.
The
process I’ve just described will have a lot of market players
screaming in outrage. In particular, anyone holding German debt or
similar assets, with the expectation that they would be protected in
the event of a eurozone breakup, will be shocked to find they are not
shielded at all. And since there have been no defaults, since there
has been no breach of contract, plain vanilla credit default swaps
would not be triggered.
A
lot of citizens from the exiting countries would also be quite
unhappy to see the value of their euro-denominated savings shrink
with the depreciating euro. To mollify their own citizens, each
exiting country would therefore issue tradable warrants giving
holders the right to convert euros into the legacy currency at the
same rate where the legacy currency was converted into euros back
when the common currency was launched. Each citizen and “qualified”
corporation would receive those warrants in amounts equal to two or
three years of income. In addition, banks headquartered in the
exiting country would probably receive warrants in the amount of
twice or thrice their capital. (As an aside, this could go a long way
toward recapitalizing those still questionable banks.)
So
there we are! Aside from Greece, the eurozone has broken apart
without any defaults, without any banking holidays and without any
credit default swaps being triggered. And even the Greek default was
quickly cured when the ECB began massively monetizing its debt. Of
course, none of the underlying economic problems that led to the
breakdown have been resolved. The structural imbalances and
impediments to economic growth still remain. And the division of
Europe into a northern and southern bloc could easily lay the
groundwork for the world’s next great conflict. **
As
long as I’m painting “what if” scenarios, consider how the
struggle in Ukraine might turn out. With Europe divided, the Club Med
countries remaining in the eurozone will surely seek to solidify and
expand their economic heft. It’s not hard to imagine the rump
eurozone pushing east. The ten northern European members that
withdrew could be replaced by ten new members from the Balkans. Once
the eurozone bumps up against Ukraine, it’s easy to imagine a deal
with Russia. In return for energy, trade and banking agreements, the
rump eurozone accepts the dismembering of Ukraine and gives official
recognition to the Republic of South Ukraine, a nation allied with
Russia and bordering Moldova. I think you can already see the
nightmare developing.
I
could go on and on with possible scenarios on how the breakup of the
eurozone might turn out for better or worse. Belgium could split up,
with Flanders joining the Netherlands and Wallonia joining France.
Northern Italy could secede, become independent and join the northern
bloc. Maybe Ukraine leads to WW III, or maybe Germany and Russia come
to agreement on carving up the country along ethnic lines. Who knows,
maybe Texas secedes and becomes the capitol of a new USA, the
northeastern states become the USSA and join the rump eurozone, and
Latin America becomes a colony of China. Stranger things have
happened.
Addendum (15 February 2015)
The
more I watch negotiations between Greece and the eurozone authorities
drag out, the more convinced I become that the Greek objective is to
break up the eurozone. I think it’s universally agreed that a
return to the drachma would be a disaster. What Greece really wants
to do – I think – is remain in the eurozone and have its debt
monetized. And that’s exactly what France, Italy, Spain, Portugal
and numerous other countries want.
The
problem: Germany and other hard-money countries are adamantly opposed
to debt monetization policies. The solution: convince Germany et al.
to pull out and leave the eurozone to its weak members. And a Greek
default is exactly what is needed to force the issue.
I
edited this post to correct some errors in the original version. For
any purists out there, here is how those paragraphs were originally
written; the errors should be obvious.
*
“Then,
when each exiting country has put in place the technical requirements
for resurrecting its legacy currency, its central bank will begin
auctioning off a portion of its euro reserves and thereby inject some
of the newly resurrected currency into the banking system. In the
early days these resurrected currencies may only exist in electronic
form, just like the euro when it was first introduced, but notes and
coins should start to circulate within a matter of weeks.
Simultaneously with its central bank injecting the resurrected
currency into the banking system by selling euro reserves, the
government of each exiting country will auction debt denominated in
said legacy currency.”
**
“So
there we are! The eurozone has broken apart without any defaults,
without any contracts being breached, and without any banking
holidays being declared. Of course, none of the underlying economic
problems that led to the breakdown have been resolved. The structural
imbalances and impediments to economic growth still remain. And the
division of Europe into a northern and southern bloc could easily lay
the groundwork for the world’s next great conflict.”